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During some recent financial crises, the majority of domestic banks - or indeed the entire 
banking sector - became insolvent. We have analyzed the welfare effects of policy responses 
to bank insolvency by examining a modified version of the Diamond-Rajan model, 
introducing a fiat currency. The sources of inefficiency in our model are the ”moral hazard 
in banking” and the “premature liquidation of bank assets”. The model assumes that 
banking system insolvency is caused by an exogenous macroeconomic shock that destroys a 
portion of banks' assets. 
If the government does not intervene in very severe cases of bank insolvency, a fire sale of 
all bank assets can occur along with dis-intermediation of the economy and falls in price 
levels (debt deflation). 
We have analyzed the consequences of the following three different policy responses to 
bank insolvency: (1) providing deposit guarantees (without immediate recapitalization), (2) 
providing unlimited liquidity support, and (3) effecting bank recapitalization through 
either cash creation (monetary policy) or bond issuance (fiscal policy). In doing so, we 
showed that bank recapitalization by fiscal measures provides the optimal solution. Our 
findings imply that Japan's protracted recession and deflation problem may have been 
caused by an inappropriate policy response to bank insolvency. 
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1 1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze a banking crisis, subsequent debt deﬂation, and the policy
responses to the crisis in a model where ﬁat currency is introduced and contracts are
made in nominal terms.
In the recent theoretical research on banking crises, many theories have been proposed
concerning the mechanism by which ﬁnancial crises occur (Diamond and Dybvig [1983],
Postlewaite and Vives [1987], and Allen and Gale [1998, 2000, 2001]). But there are
not so many theories that explain the diﬀerence of recovery paths from the crises in
accordance with diﬀerent policy responses. For example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (1999), and Martin (2001) discuss the policies to prevent bank
runs, but not policy responses to bank insolvency. Only a few authors like Diamond and
Rajan (2002a, b), Bergoeing, et al. (2002), and Boyd, Chang, and Smith (2000) consider
ex post policy responses to ﬁnancial crises.
The world has experienced a large number of banking crises in the last three decades.
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) identiﬁed 113 systemic banking crises that had occurred
in 93 countries since the late 1970s, along with 50 borderline and smaller banking crises
in 44 countries over the same period. In analyzing these experiences, researchers have
come to pay more attention to bank insolvency than to bank runs. Recent crisis episodes
suggest that bank insolvency is the central problem to be rectiﬁed and that a temporary
shortage of liquidity is basically a symptom. Diamond and Rajan (2002a) also refer
to the theoretical possibility of two-way linkage between bank insolvency and liquidity
shortages.
One common observation concerning ﬁnancial crises is the decline of the inﬂation rate
after the onset of a banking crisis (Boyd et al. [2001]). The United States experienced
severe deﬂation associated with a rash of bank failures in the 1930s, and Japan is now
experiencing a bout of deﬂation following the onset of a banking crisis in the late 1990s.
Boyd et al. (2001) show that the onset of a banking crisis decreases the growth rate of
M2, which is a signiﬁcant element contributing to inﬂation. The low inﬂation or deﬂation
associated with a banking crisis may be modeled as debt deﬂation (Fisher [1933]). In
2this paper we formalize the notion of debt deﬂa t i o ni nas i m p l em o d e l .
Several facts about the recovery paths from banking crises have been found by case
studies and empirical research on recent ﬁnancial crises (see, for example, Claessens,
Klingebiel, and Laeven [2001], Alexander et al. [1997], Caprio and Klingebiel [1996]).
Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) ﬁnd that open-ended liquidity support, regulatory for-
bearance, and an unlimited deposit guarantee are all signiﬁcant contributors to the ﬁscal
cost of resolving a banking crisis. They also ﬁnd that liquidity support signiﬁcantly
increases the output loss or delays the economic recovery. (This result is conﬁrmed by
Bordo et al. [2001], who used a broader data set.) Boyd et al. (2001) also claim that
incremental expenditures for banking system bailouts may increase output losses. On
the other hand, Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2001) show that liquidity support
and a deposit guarantee may be eﬀective in promoting a recovery of proﬁtability in the
corporate sector if these measures are combined with the establishment of an asset man-
agement agency. Although empirical analyses have not produced a consensus concerning
the eﬀects of bank bailouts, it seems the case that a temporizing policy such as liquid-
ity support or a deposit guarantee without the restoration of bank solvency may hinder
economic recovery and magnify the ﬁscal cost.
In any case the banking system must be recapitalized in order for an economic system
hit by a banking crisis to restore its normal functions. There are many important practi-
cal issues concerning bank recapitalization, such as the source of funds, the loss sharing
by depositors, the incentive mechanism for banks’ management, the design of ﬁnancial
instruments, and the exit strategy for the government (Honohan [2001]). Whether or
not to monetize the cost of recapitalization is one big issue in the policy debate. For
example, inﬂation targeting, or extraordinary monetary easing, has become the focus of
t h em a c r o e c o n o m i cp o l i c yd e b a t ei nJ a p a ns i n c et h eﬁnancial crisis of 1998. One of the
objectives of inﬂation targeting in today’s Japan would obviously be to monetize the
cost of recapitalizing the banking system. Thus, the provision of a theoretical basis for
judging the costs and eﬀects of a monetization policy is very important as a practical
matter for crisis-aﬀected countries. The recent crisis episodes show that bank bailout
3costs are typically not monetized (Boyd et al. [2001]). We can ask whether there was
any economic ground for the policymakers’ decision not to monetize the cost of bank
recapitalization in those episodes.
Our aim in this paper is to formalize debt deﬂation, i.e., the decline of the inﬂa-
tion rate associated with a banking crisis, and to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent policy
responses to bank insolvency. In order to model the debt deﬂation, we construct a vari-
ant of the Diamond-Rajan model (Diamond and Rajan [2001]) in which we introduce
ﬁat currency using a cash-in-advance constraint. In this variant Diamond-Rajan model,
banks are subject to moral hazard, i.e., ineﬃcient use of capital, but this can be deterred
by the threat of bank runs by depositors - a threat that is made credible by the use of
demand deposit contracts. On the other hand, if bank runs occur, banks are forced to
liquidate their assets prematurely. Thus, in this model the sources of ineﬃciency are
moral hazard and the premature liquidation of bank assets.
In our model, we do not describe how ﬁnancial crises occur; we merely posit that
all banks become insolvent as a result of an unspeciﬁed macroeconomic shock (e.g., the
bursting of an asset-price bubble or a fall in the currency exchange rate) that suddenly
decreases the value of all bank assets. Taking this banking system insolvency as given,
we focus our analysis on the welfare properties of the following policy responses: (1)
a deposit guarantee, (2) unlimited liquidity support, (3) bank recapitalization through
cash creation (monetary recapitalization), and (4) bank recapitalization through bond
issuance (ﬁscal recapitalization).
If the government takes no action in response to bank insolvency, all households will
withdraw their deposits immediately, since they know that the banks’ assets are less than
their liabilities. In this case, all the banks experience depositor runs, all their assets must
be liquidated prematurely, price levels fall, and the welfare of households deteriorates.
If the government implements a deposit guarantee policy and/or an unlimited liq-
uidity support policy, it is easily shown that, while bank runs are prevented, banks are
inevitably subject to moral hazard. This is because under these policies the government
gives the banks a commitment to provide them resources without limit.
4In order to avoid generating moral hazard, the government must combine the provi-
sion of additional resources ex ante to banks (recapitalization) with a credible declaration
that it will not provide any more ex post. The government has two options in ﬁnancing
the cost of recapitalization: monetization or taxation. In the case where the government
implements the bank recapitalization by creating cash (monetary recapitalization), it is
shown that moral hazard cannot be prevented, since the monetary recapitalization af-
fects the banks’ incentive to hold cash reserves through the cash-in-advance constraint.
In the case where the government implements the bank recapitalization by issuing bonds
(ﬁscal recapitalization), it is shown that the optimal outcome is achieved, avoiding both
moral hazard and the premature liquidation of assets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the basic model.
Section 3 analyzes debt deﬂation, which is triggered by bank insolvency resulting from
an unexpected macroeconomic shock. Section 4 compares the welfare eﬀects of several
policy options. And Section 5 presents the conclusion.
2 Basic Model
The economy consists of continua of consumers and of banks. For simplicity of exposition,
we shall normalize the measure of each continuum to 1. But we assume that each bank
has inﬁnitely many consumers as its depositors.1 There is also the government. The
economy continues for two consecutive periods bounded by three dates: t =0 ,1,2.
There is one type of good (consumer good) in this economy that can be consumed by
consumers. Banks can transform the consumer good into productive capital, and only
banks can use capital and produce the consumer goods at date 1 and date 2.
2.1 Consumers
A consumer maximizes his utility u(c0)+βu(c1)+β2u(c2), where u(c)s a t i s ﬁes the usual
neoclassical properties (u0(c) > 0,u 00(c) < 0,limc→0 u0(c)=∞), ct is the consumption
1This statement can be justiﬁed by assuming that a bank is indexed by α where α ∈ [0,1], while a
consumer is indexed by (α,γ)w h e r e( α,γ) ∈ [0,1]
2.
5at date t and β is the time discount factor. For simplicity we assume u(c)=l n c in
what follows. At date 0 each consumer is endowed with E units of consumer goods and
M units of useless paper that is provided by the government and is called “cash.” The
government levies a tax of M u n i t so fc a s ho ne a c hc o n s u m e ra td a t e2 .A l t h o u g hc a s h
is intrinsically useless for consumers, we posit the following cash-in-advance constraint
that makes cash a medium of exchange:
Assumption 1 (Cash-In-Advance Constraint) A consumer must use cash to purchase
the consumer good.
There is no endowment for consumers at dates 1 and 2. There are three assets available
to consumers as stores of value: the consumer good (stored rather than consumed), cash,
and bank deposits.2 If a consumer stores y units of the consumer good at date t,t h e nh e
will still have y u n i t so ft h eg o o d sa td a t et+1. Thisisstorage technology. Alternatively,
a consumer can deposit the consumer goods and/or cash that he has at date t in a bank
in exchange for a nominal claim on the bank (i.e., a demand deposit) Dt at date t.W e
make the following assumption for the deposit contract:
Assumption 2 T h ed e p o s i tc o n t r a c tc a nb em a d eo n l yi nn o m i n a lt e r m s .Ac o n t r a c ti n
real terms between consumers and banks is not allowed.
This assumption can be justiﬁed as follows: Though it may be possible to observe a
change of price levels, it is not easy for depositors or banks to verify the amplitude of
the change; therefore, real-term contracts cannot readily be implemented in the private
sector. For simplicity we prohibit real-term contracts in our model. We will see in
Section 2.2 that the following characteristic of the demand deposit contract is necessary
to prevent moral hazard for banks.
Assumption 3 A demand deposit is a contract between a bank and a consumer such
that the consumer (depositor) can withdraw any amount of cash up to his bank balance
at any time.
2In the equilibrium where the nominal interest rate is positive, consumers do not hold cash, but they
hold bank deposits.
6This assumption states that consumers can withdraw any amount of cash just before
they buy the consumer good, implying that the cash-in-advance constraint does not
enter in the consumer’s optimization program as it usually does in ordinary cash-in-
advance models (see, for example, Sargent [1987]). As we will state in Section 2.2 that
banks’ production technology is more eﬃcient than storage technology, we consider for
a moment the consumer’s optimization problem on the premise that consumers choose
bank deposits as their only assets.3 In this case, consumers solve the following problem
taking prices (p0,p 1,p 2), nominal interest rates (i0,i 1), endowments (E,M), and the tax





    
    
p0c0 + D0 ≤ p0E + M,
p1c1 + D1 ≤ (1 + i0)D0,
p2c2 + T2 ≤ (1 + i1)D1,
(1)
where u(ct)=l nct,a n dDt is the demand deposit remaining at date t.
2.2 Banks
Our model of the banking sector is a simpliﬁed version of the Diamond-Rajan model
(Diamond and Rajan [2001]).
Production Technology At date 0 a bank can transform K0 units of the consumer
good that are deposited by consumers into the same amount of capital, i.e., K0 units
of capital. Only banks, not consumers, can use the capital to produce the consumer
good. Suppose that a bank (bank α,0≤ α ≤ 1) forms capital of K0α at date 0. Bank α
can produce AK0α units of the consumer good at date 1, while the capital depreciates
3Grossman and Weiss (1983) also construct a model in which they impose a restriction that only
banks hold cash and the depositors do not, while in our model the banks’ decisions on holding cash
reserves are endogenous, as discussed in Section 2.4.
7completely to zero.4 If bank α sells y1α units of the consumer good to consumers, it can
invest the rest and form capital of K1α,w h e r eK1α = AK0α−y1α. At date 2 bank α can
produce AK1α units of the consumer good, while its capital K1α depreciates completely
to zero. This is the standard AK-technology of the neoclassical growth model. We
assume
1 <A ,
which implies that the bank’s production technology is more eﬃcient than storage tech-
nology. We assume that bank α can also use its capital ineﬃciently. For simplicity of
analysis, we assume the following:
Assumption 4 Bank α can attain either high productivity (A)b ye ﬃcient use of capital
K0α or low productivity (a)b yi n e ﬃcient use of capital, where
1 ≤ a<A . (2)
Bank α’s choice variables are (1) the eﬃciency in use of capital (eﬃcient or ineﬃcient),
and (2) the amounts of sale and investment (see the bank’s problem (PB) below). Bank
α obtains private utility at dates 1 and 2 if it continues to operate. The private utility at
date t (Ut)i s0i fb a n kα stops its operation at date t, b if it chooses ineﬃcient use of
capital, and b−² if it chooses eﬃcient use of capital, where ² (0 <²<b ) is the eﬀort that
is necessary to use capital eﬃciently. The eﬀort ² is observable but not veriﬁable for the
other agents so that contracts contingent on ² is infeasible. A bank’s primary objective
is to maximize the present value of its private utility
V ≡ βU1 + β2U2.
Like Diamond and Rajan, we assume the following “relation-speciﬁcity” in this produc-
tion technology of banks: Only bank α can use K0α most eﬃciently, since bank α has
relation-speciﬁc knowledge that other banks do not have about K0α, such as the detailed
structure of the business model and the eﬃcient use of the equipment in question. If
4We assume for simplicity that the capital investment by a bank is reversible: the bank can transform
the capital back into the consumer good at any time before the production takes place.
8bank α0 (α0 6= α,0≤ α0 ≤ 1) takes over K0α,i tc a np r o d u c ea0K0α units of the consumer
good at date 1, while the capital K0α depreciates to zero. We assume
1 ≤ a0 <a<A . (3)
After selling y0 units of the consumer good, bank α0 can form K0
1 = a0K0α − y0,a n dc a n
produce AK0
1 units of the consumer good at date 2, while K0
1 depreciates to zero.
Bank’s Problem Competition for depositors among banks forces a bank to maximize
their value, since otherwise it cannot collect deposits and is forced to stop operating,
and its private utility is driven down to zero. When the nominal interest rate is strictly
positive (it > 0), the competition among banks also makes them commit to eﬃcient use
of capital, and they obtain U1 = U2 = b−²; a bank chooses eﬃcient use of capital if the
other banks use capital eﬃciently, since otherwise it cannot collect deposit and is forced
to stop operating. (See Lemma 1 for the case where it = 0.) Thus a bank (bank α)
solves the following problem taking prices (p0,p 1,p 2), interest rates (i0,i 1)w h e r ei0 > 0








(1 + i0)(1 + i1)
y2
subject to 
           
           
y0 ≤ E,
K0α = E − y0,
y1 ≤ AK0α,
K1α = AK0α − y1,
y2 ≤ AK1α.
(4)
Cash Reserves and Fire Sales Consumers deposit units of the consumer good (E)
a n dc a s h( M) in banks at date 0. In the equilibrium where the nominal interest rate is
positive, value-maximizing banks will not hold cash unless cash enhances their eﬃciency.
Instead they will use any cash they have to buy the consumer good, which they will then
transform into capital. In order to make a non-trivial choice problem between cash and
capital, we set the following (realistic) assumption for the cash reserve of banks:
9Assumption 5 Let Wt be the withdrawal demand from a bank’s depositors at date t.
T h eb a n kc a np a yWt in two ways. (1) It can use a cash reserve Mt−1 that was set at
date t−1. (2) It can sell the consumer good yt at date t and use the cash income ptyt to
repay the depositors at date t.W ew i l lc a l lt h es e c o n dm e t h o da“ ﬁre sale.” If the bank
uses the ﬁre sale, it incurs a “deadweight loss”: 1−x
x yt u n i t so ft h ec o n s u m e rg o o d sw h e r e
0 <x<β.
The deadweight loss 1−x
x yt is not incurred if the proceeds of a sale are kept as a cash
reserve for date t +1 .
This assumption states that a bank facing withdrawals by depositors must raise cash
t h r o u g ha ni n e ﬃcient ﬁre sale of goods if it does not have a suﬃcient cash reserve. The
assumption implies that a bank must produce 1
xyt > β−1yt in order to sell yt in the ﬁre
s a l e .T h i sl o s sr e p r e s e n t st h ei n e ﬃciency involved in a ﬁre sale of bank assets in reality.
Note that the deadweight loss is not incurred if the proceeds of the sale are not paid out
at the same date but are kept as a cash reserve for the next date. This feature of the
deadweight loss can be justiﬁed as follows: The ineﬃciency of a ﬁre sale occurs when a
bank sells an asset to someone who cannot use it most eﬃciently. A bank cannot ﬁnd
the best buyer if it does not have enough time to search among the possible buyers. And
banks that do not have enough reserves on hand must raise cash immediately to pay
their depositors; they have no time to search for good buyers; they suﬀer the deadweight
loss by selling the goods to suboptimal buyers. On the other hand, banks that have
enough reserves have enough time to ﬁnd the best buyer since they do not need to pay
out the proceeds of the sale immediately; they do not incur the deadweight loss. This is
the reason why a deadweight loss is incurred in our model only when the bank pays out
the proceeds of the sale to the depositors on the same date.
Demand Deposit The above relation-speciﬁct e c h n o l o g yj u s t i ﬁes the aforesaid char-
acteristic of demand deposits (Assumption 3). Suppose that D0 is the demand deposit
remaining at the end of date 0. As we will see later, in the equilibrium the date-0 with-
drawal p0c0 is equal to M, y0 = c0, and no ﬁre sale occurs at date 0. In this case, if the
10contract made at date 0 between the consumer and bank α is not renegotiated at a later




(1+i0)(1+i1)y2 + M,w h e r e
(y1,y 2) is the solution to (PB). But the relation-speciﬁc technology prevents banks from
committing not to renegotiate after a contract is established. We assume the following:
Assumption 6 Bank α can walk away at any time, leaving the capital (K0α between
date 0 and date 1, or K1α = AK0α − y0 b e t w e e nd a t e1a n dd a t e2 )f o rt h ed e p o s i t o r s .
If bank α walks away, the only thing the depositors can do is to deposit the capital that
bank α left in another bank α0 and let bank α0 use the capital.
After forming the relation-speciﬁcc a p i t a lK0α,b a n kα,k n o w i n gt h a ti tc a nw a l ka w a y
at any time, has an incentive to oﬀer D0








2 + M,w h e r e
y0
1 ≤ aK0α and y0
2 ≤ a(aK0α − y0
1), instead of D0 to the consumer. Assumption 6 and
equation (3) imply that the rational consumer will always accept the oﬀer D0
0.
Therefore, if the contract between consumers and banks is a renegotiable debt con-
tract, banks will always renegotiate their obligation down to D0
0, they will choose ineﬃ-
cient use of capital, and productivity will decline to a. Diamond and Rajan (2001) point
out that demand deposits are a tool for banks to credibly commit not to renegotiate later.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose that the demand deposit contract gives depositors
the right to withdraw the full amount of their deposit from bank α at any time. If bank
α tries to renegotiate at a time between date 0 and date 1, depositors will rationally
exert their right to withdraw, and this will result in a run on the bank. The bank run
results in the ﬁre sale of all the bank’s assets, and bank α is forced to stop operating
at date 1. In this case, bank α cannot obtain the private utility Ut at dates 1 and 2.
Anticipating this result, a bank will not try to renegotiate as long as the date 0 contract
between depositors and banks is a demand deposit. The same argument implies that
banks will not renegotiate at any time between dates 1 and 2. In Section 2.4 we will
show more rigorously that demand deposits prevent renegotiation in the equilibrium.
In our model, depositors withdraw cash, not the consumer good as in the Diamond-
Rajan model. This diﬀerence necessitates the following assumption for demand deposits
to prevent renegotiation.
11Assumption 7 A consumer who withdraws his deposit from a bank can deposit the cash
he has withdrawn in another bank at the same rate of return (i0,i 1).
This assumption states that banks must accept deposits from consumers at any time on
the same terms and conditions. Unless Assumption 7 holds, consumers who withdraw
their deposits in a run on a bank must either hold the proceeds as cash or buy consumer
goods and store them. Since holding cash or storing consumer goods provides less con-
sumption to consumers, they may rationally accept the renegotiation by banks instead
of withdrawing their deposits in bank runs. Therefore, both Assumptions 3 and 7 must
hold for demand deposits to prevent renegotiation in our model, while Assumption 3 is
suﬃcient in the Diamond-Rajan model, where the deposit contract is made in real terms.
2.3 Timing of Events
We summarize the timing of events in our model. At date 0, the consumers are endowed
with E units of the consumer good and M units of cash. They deposit E and M in
banks in exchange for the nominal claims D (demand deposits) on the banks. After
receiving E and M, banks have a chance to buy and sell the consumer goods at price
p0 among themselves to adjust their asset portfolio and cash reserves. (In the Financial
Intermediation Equilibrium [FIE] deﬁned in Section 2.4 no trading occurs.) Then con-
sumers withdraw p0c0 units of cash from banks and buy c0 units of the consumer good.
It is shown in Section 2.4 that the withdrawal p0c0 must be equal to the cash reserve M
in the FIE. The remaining demand deposits become D0 = D − p0c0.A t t h i s s t a g e , a
bank has E − c0 units of the consumer good and M u n i t so fc a s ha si t sa s s e t sa n dD0
as its liabilities. Then banks have another chance to buy and sell the consumer good at
price p0 among themselves in order to achieve their optimal level of cash reserves M0.
(M0 = M in the FIE.) The banks next transform the consumer good E −c0 into capital
K0 = E − c0. After forming their capital, banks have an incentive to renegotiate with
the depositors, but they do not actually oﬀer renegotiation in the equilibrium, since such
an oﬀer would induce a run on the bank that made it.
At date 1, the banks produce AK0 units of the consumer good. The demand deposit
12becomes (1 + i0)D0.C o n s u m e r s w i t h d r a w p1c1 units of cash and buy c1 units of the
consumer good. If the withdrawal p1c1 >M 0,aﬁre sale occurs. In the equilibrium
p1c1 = M0 = M. The remaining demand deposits become D1 =( 1+i0)D0 −p1c1.T h e n
banks have a chance to sell and buy the consumer good at price p1 among themselves
so as to achieve their desired level of cash reserves M1. (No trade occurs, and M1 = M
in the FIE.) Then banks transform the remaining consumer goods AK0 −c1 into capital
K1 = AK0 − c1. After forming this new capital, banks again have an incentive to
renegotiate, but again they do not actually oﬀer renegotiation in the equilibrium.
At date 2, the banks produce AK1 units of the consumer good. The demand deposits
become (1 + i1)D1.C o n s u m e r s w i t h d r a w p2c2 units of cash and buy c2 units of the
consumer good. If p2c2 >M 1,aﬁre sale occurs. In the equilibrium p2c2 = M1 = M.
The remaining demand deposits become D2 =( 1+i1)D1 − p2c2.T h eg o v e r n m e n tt h e n
requires consumers to pay a tax T2 = M.C o n s u m e r sw i t h d r a wT2 from banks, they pay
the tax, and the economy ends. In the FIE, D2 = T2 = M must hold.
2.4 Optimal Equilibrium
We deﬁne the Financial Intermediation Equilibrium (FIE) as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 The Financial Intermediation Equilibrium is the set of prices (p0,p 1,p 2,i 0,i 1),
endowments (E,M), tax (T2), and allocation (c0,c 1,c 2) such that (1) the allocation
(c0,c 1,c 2) is the solution to (PC) given the prices, endowments, and tax; (2) (y0,y 1,y 2)
=( c0,c 1,c 2) is the solution to (PB) given the prices and the endowment E; (3) Given
the prices and the withdrawals (p0c0,p 1c1,p 2c2), banks rationally choose to hold cash re-
serves of Mt = pt+1ct+1 at each date t =0 ,1; (4) The money market clears Mt = M
at each date t; (5) Given the prices, banks rationally withhold oﬀering renegotiation to
depositors.
We will show that the optimal allocation is attainable in the Financial Intermediation





    
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c0 ≤ E,
c1 ≤ A(E − c0),


























We assume that the parameters satisfy the following:
Assumption 8 The parameters β and x satisfy (2−x)β2+(1−x)β > 1 and (2−x)β > 1.
For example, β ≥ .9a n dx ≤ .8 satisfy this condition. This assumption guarantees that
Assumptions 3 and 7 are suﬃcient to prevent renegotiation in the FIE. In a decentralized

















(1 + i1). (8)






(1 + i1)=A. (9)












1,β−1 − 1) and the allocation (c∗
0,c ∗
1,c ∗
2)s a t i s ﬁes the FOCs (8) and (9). We can now
demonstrate the following proposition:





1) and the allocation (c∗
0,c ∗
1,c ∗
2)i st h e
Financial Intermediation Equilibrium.
(Proof) It is suﬃc i e n tt os h o wt h a tb a n k sr a t i o n a l l ys e tt h ec a s hr e s e r v ea tMt = M for t =0 ,1,
and that they rationally withhold oﬀering renegotiation. Given the prices, the withdrawals at






2 = M. At the beginning of date 0, each bank has M units
of cash, as the consumers deposit all their cash. Before depositors withdraw p∗
0c∗
0,b a n k sc a n




0 = M, banks incur a deadweight loss (Assumption 5). Thus banks desire for R to
b eg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt oM. Since banks have another chance to sell and buy the consumer
goods at the same price p∗
0 after the withdrawal of p∗
0c∗
0, they are indiﬀerent whether R = M or
R>M. Therefore, banks set their reserves at the level of the money supply M.
When depositors withdraw p∗
0c∗
0,t h ec a s hM is withdrawn temporarily but is returned to the
banks on the same date in the form of the proceeds from sales of the consumer good y0 = c∗
0.
At this point banks, anticipating that withdrawals at date 1 will be p∗
1c∗
1 = M,h a v et h ec h a n c e
to change the level of their cash reserves (M0) by buying and selling the consumer good at p∗
0
a m o n gt h e m s e l v e s .I fab a n ks e t sM0 to be greater than the expected withdrawals (M), it loses the





(β−1 −1)(M0 −M) units of cash. Thus M0 must be no greater than M. If a bank sets M0 <M,
it can buy 1
p∗
0(M − M0) units of the consumer good and produce A
p∗
0(M − M0)a td a t e1 .B u ta t
date 1 the bank must sell part of its output in a ﬁre sale in order to obtain cash M −M0 to pay




0(M − M0) − 1
x(M − M0)=( β−1 − x−1)(M − M0),
which is less than zero because of Assumption 5. Therefore banks set M0 = M given the prices
(p∗
0,p ∗
1). It is shown that M1 = M b yt h es a m ea r g u m e n t .
Next we show that banks rationally withhold renegotiation. In this equilibrium the budget
constraint of (PC) implies that (1 + i∗
1)D1 = p∗
2c∗
2 + T2 =2 M,( 1+i∗
0)D0 = p∗
1c∗
1 +2 βM =
(1 + 2β)M,a n dD0 =( 1 + 2 β)βM. Therefore the bank’s liability at the end of date 0 is
D0 =( 1+2 β)βM,w h i l et h eb a n k ’ sa s s e t sa r eM units of cash and E − c∗
0 units of capital.
The bank has the incentive to renegotiate with depositors at a time after it forms the capital
K0 = E − c∗
0 and before it produces the date 1 consumer good AK0. If at this time the bank
oﬀers renegotiation and experiences a run by the depositors, then it will be forced to transform
E − c∗
0 back into units of the consumer good and to sell them in a ﬁre sale. In this case the
total cash the bank can pay out becomes M + p∗
0x(E − c∗
0)=( 1+βx + β2x)M. Assumption 8
guarantees that the bank will go bankrupt if there is a run on it by depositors at the end of date
0. Anticipating this result, banks rationally withhold renegotiation at the end of date 0.
Similarly, at the end of date 1 when the bank has the incentive to renegotiate, its liability
is D1 =2 βM, while the total cash the bank can pay out after the ﬁre sale is (1 + βx)M.T h u s
Assumption 8 guarantees that the bank will go bankrupt if a bank run occurs, and that banks
15rationally withhold renegotiation at the end of date 1. (End of Proof)
Thus in the FIE, the most eﬃcient use of capital and the optimal consumption
allocation are realized by demand deposit contracts between banks and consumers.
3 Banking Crisis
The recent episodes of banking crises have often involved the emergence and subsequent
collapse of an asset-price bubble. In this paper we do not analyze how the bubble emerges
or how it collapses. Our focus is on how the collapse aﬀects the banking sector and on the
overall economy. Thus in our model we describe the bubble’s collapse as an unexpected
macroeconomic shock that destroys a portion of the real output of the economy. The
occurrence of this shock is assumed to be a measure-zero event, in the sense that the
agents in the economy have no expectation of the shock beforehand. We can modify
our model to treat the macro shock as a random variable the probability distribution of
which is known ex ante to the agents. But this modiﬁcation does not essentially change
the results that we describe below, since our results mainly concern the responses of
t h ee c o n o m i ca g e n t safter the shock hits. Thus for simplicity of exposition we assume
that the ex ante probability of the shock (bubble collapse) equals zero5,a n dt h a ta l l







3.1 Bubble Collapse, Price Adjustment, and Zero Nominal Interest
Rate
We formalize the bubble collapse at the beginning of date 1 as follows. At a time after
AK0 = A(E −c∗
0) units of the consumer good are produced and the equilibrium price p∗
1
is announced but before the goods are sold to consumers, a macro shock λ (0 ≤ λ < 1)
hits the economy unexpectedly and destroys (1 − λ)AK0 of each bank’s output. Since
5This modeling strategy is same as Loewy (1991). Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001) also
adopt the same modeling strategy to analyze currency crises.
16the ex post output is λAK0 after the bubble collapse at date 1, the optimal allocation
after the shock becomes (c1,c 2)=( λc∗
1,λc∗
2). The optimal allocation is realized as an




show that the optimal equilibrium is realized by a standard price adjustment process if
depositors cannot make a run on banks before the price system changes.
Baseline Case If consumers cannot make a run on banks quickly, they solve the





p1c1 + D1 ≤ (1 + i∗
0)D∗
0 =( 1+2 β)M,








We assume that the new interest rate i1 > 0 (we will examine the case where i1 =0
later). In this case, consumers never hold cash; they hold only bank deposits. We also
assume that the government does not transfer goods or cash from consumers to banks.
Under these assumptions, when banks sell units of the consumer good at date 2, their
remaining liability after withdrawals ((1 + i1)D1 − p2c2)m u s tb ee q u a lt ot h e i ri n c o m e
(p2c2). Thus we have the equilibrium condition: p2c2 = 1
2(1 + i1)D1 = T2.S i n c e t h e
government does not change its tax policy, T2 = M. Thus, in the equilibrium p2c2 = M







β(1+i1). This condition and the budget constraint (10) imply
1+i1 = β−1. Therefore p1c1 = M.T h e F O C ( c2
c1 = βA)a n dt h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n t
(c2 = A{λAK0 − c0})i m p l yt h a tc1 = λAK0
1+β = λc∗
1 and c2 = βAc1 = λc∗
2.T h u s ,t h en e w
equilibrium price system (p1,p 2,i 1)=( λ−1p∗
1,λ−1p∗
2,β−1 − 1) is uniquely determined in
t h ec a s ew h e r ei1 > 0.
If the government sets the interest rate at zero: i1 = 0, the consumers hold both cash
17and bank deposits. We can show that banks will choose the ineﬃcient use of capital if
the nominal interest rate is zero:
Lemma 1 Suppose that the economy is in an equilibrium where the nominal interest rate
is zero and banks continue to operate at dates 1 and 2. Each bank chooses the ineﬃcient
use of capital and the aggregate productivity of the economy becomes a.
(Proof) Since the banks continue to operate at dates 1 and 2 under a zero nominal interest rate,
the prices satisfy the FOC for the banks:
p1
p2
= ˜ A, (11)
where ˜ A is the productivity of capital, which is A if the bank chooses the eﬃcient use of capital,
and is a if it chooses the ineﬃcient use. We will prove that a bank holds only cash rather than
capital if the other banks choose eﬃcient use of capital. Suppose that all banks choose the
eﬃcient use of capital. Then
p1
p2 = A. This condition and Assumption 4 imply that a bank can
obtain the same return A by holding cash without exerting eﬀort ². Therefore when a bank enters
into deposit contracts with depositors at date 1, it promises them the same return as the other
banks, and it holds only cash, because by doing so the bank can fulﬁll the promise made to the
depositors and can save the eﬀort ² that must be exerted to fulﬁll the promise by using capital.
Therefore no banks will hold capital in the equilibrium where i1 =0a n d
p1
p2 = A. T h i si sa
contradiction, since if no banks hold capital then
p1
p2 = A does not hold. Thus, in the equilibrium
where i1 =0i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
p1
p2 = a,a n da l lb a n k sc h o o s et h ei n e ﬃcient use of capital.
(End of Proof)
This lemma says that if i1 =0t h eb a n k sn e v e rp r o m i s et h ee ﬃcient use of capital in
the ﬁrst place. Therefore the demand deposit contract, which does not allow subsequent
renegotiation, cannot prevent the ineﬃciency of moral hazard when i1 = 0. The impli-
cation of this lemma is similar to Smith’s view that the Friedman rule is not the optimal
policy in the economy where the ﬁnancial intermediaries play a signiﬁcant role (Smith
[2002]).
It is easily shown that if i1 = 0 and the depositors cannot make runs on banks,
there exists a continuum of equilibria in which moral hazard exists for the banks. When




the budget constraint imply p1c1 =
2βM
1+β and p2c2 =
2β2M
1+β . The FOCs and the resource
constraint imply that (c1,c 2)=( λc∗
1,λβac∗
1). The equilibrium condition for banks is
D1−W = p2c2, and the equilibrium conditions for consumers are W +M1−R = p2c2 and
D1−W +R = T2,w h e r eW is the amount of withdrawals at date 2 and R is cash held by
consumers that is not used for the purchase of the goods but used for tax payment. The







The deposits and cash holdings are indeterminate: D1 =
2β2
1+βM + W and M1 = M −W
for 0 ≤ W ≤ M. It is easily shown that banks have incentive to hold cash reserves W
given that withdrawals at date 2 are W.
The above baseline case for i1 > 0 is realized if consumers cannot make runs on
banks before the price system changes. Although it is quite plausible to assume that
prices adjust instantaneously in a neoclassical growth model, the assumption of perfectly
ﬂexible prices is not realistic in our model, where depositors who anticipate the price
change can make runs on banks and can buy consumer goods very quickly. In order
to formalize bank runs that occur as quickly as price changes, we assume that when
the price changes in the wake of the macroeconomic shock, a small group of the fastest
withdrawers can buy consumer goods at the old price, while the other withdrawers can
buy the goods only at the new equilibrium price:
Assumption 9 (Bank Runs and Price Adjustment) Suppose that the equilibrium price
changes from p∗
1 to the new price p1 after the shock λ hits the economy. If a consumer
withdraws deposit and has cash in hand before he faces the price p∗
1 or p1 at date 1, there
is a probability of π (0 < π < 1)t h a th ew i l lb ea b l et ob u yt h eg o o d sa tp∗
1 using his cash
in hand. In this case the consumer obtains an arbitrage opportunity in which he can buy
the goods at p∗
1 and sell them at the new equilibrium price p1. If he waits to withdraw his
deposit until he faces the date-1 price, he loses the chance to buy the goods at p∗
1,a n dh e
can buy the goods only at the new equilibrium price p1.
This assumption says that if the depositors withdraw fast, they have a chance to buy the
19goods at the original price p∗
1, but they lose the chance and have to buy the goods at the
new equilibrium price p1 if they wait to withdraw. Therefore, when the shock λ hits the
economy, a depositor must decide whether to make a withdrawal and, if so, how much to
withdraw on the premise that he can buy the goods at the old price p∗
1 with probability
π and at the new price with probability 1 −π. Assumption 7 guarantees that as long as
banks continue to operate, a depositor will decide about his withdrawal on the premise
that he can redeposit the cash he withdraws if it turns out after his withdrawal that he
cannot buy the consumer goods at a favorable price.
3.2 Bank Runs and Debt Deﬂation
When the unexpected shock hits the economy at the beginning of date 1, depositors
may or may not make runs on banks anticipating that the equilibrium price system will
change from the original equilibrium price (p∗
1,p ∗
2,i ∗
1) to the new one. Note that bank
runs can occur even in the FIE described in Proposition 1 if each depositor believes that
the other depositors will make a run on his bank, since a depositor who waits while all
the other depositors make a run gets nothing. This can be called a bank run due to
self-fulﬁlling prophecy. Since our focus is on whether or not the shock λ (the bubble
collapse) causes bank runs, we simply exclude the possibility of self-fulﬁlling prophecy,
as do Allen and Gale (2001).
Assumption 10 Bank runs due to self-fulﬁlling prophecy do not occur. Bank runs
occur only if withdrawing the entire deposit is a strictly better strategy for a depositor
than waiting, even if the other deposi t o r sd on o tm a k ear u no nt h eb a n k .
We also make the following assumption for simplicity.
Assumption 11 In the bank runs where all depositors seek to withdraw their entire
deposits, each depositor obtains an equal share of the total cash that the bank can pay.
We can show that if there is no government intervention, the bubble collapse (λ)c a u s e s
all depositors to make runs on their banks, and the economy is thus disintermediated.
20The following proposition shares the same intuition and implication with the results of
Loewy (1991).
Proposition 2 (Disintermediation) Suppose that the government does not intervene af-
ter the shock λ hits the economy. For λ that satisﬁes 0 ≤ λ <
2β
1+β,a l ld e p o s i t o r s
withdraw their entire deposits, and all banks go bankrupt at date 1. For λ that satisﬁes
2β
1+β ≤ λ < 1, there exist equilibria where i1 =0 , depositors do not make runs on banks,
banks continue to operate at dates 1 and 2, and the productivity becomes a as a result of
banks’ moral hazard.
(Proof) We examine the following two cases: (1) the new equilibrium price pR





I nt h ec a s ew h e r epR
1 >p ∗
1, it is obvious that the optimal choice for a depositor is to withdraw
his entire deposit in order to make use of the arbitrage opportunity that he can hope for with
a probability of π. Thus all depositors make runs on banks. In this case, banks’ liabilities are
(1+i∗
0)D0 =( 1+2 β)M, against which they have cash reserves M and the consumer goods λAK0.
In order to meet the depositors’ demand for cash, banks are ﬁrst of all forced to pay out all their
cash reserves. After they have done so, the remaining demand for cash is 2βM, while the total
cash in the economy is M, which banks can obtain by selling their goods. In the end, Assumption
11 implies that each depositor obtains 2M units of cash. The price pR
1 is determined as follows.
Since pR
1 >p ∗
1, the lucky withdrawers (measure π)s p e n d2 M to buy goods at p∗




















Therefore, if λ < 1
x(1+β), the new equilibrium price pR
1 satisﬁes pR
1 >p ∗
1, and all banks go
bankrupt at date 1.
In the second case, where pR
1 ≤ p∗
1, we prove by contradiction that all banks go bankrupt if
1
x(1+β) ≤ λ <
2β
1+β. Suppose that banks continue to operate at dates 1 and 2. In this case, the
date 2 price pR











6We assume that the lucky withdrawers obtain the cash 2M from the reserves of banks.
21because the banks maximize the present value of their assets. We assume that there is no ﬁre sale
in this equilibrium7. First we consider the case where iR
1 > 0. In this case banks’ cash reserves are





2 A(λAK0 − cR
1 )+M, which can be rewritten as










In this case if λ <
2β




This is a contradiction.
Next, in the case where iR
0 = 0 the condition that the bank’s liabilities equal its assets at
date 2 is





λ(1 + β)M + R1, (15)
where R1 is the cash reserve of the bank that satisﬁes R1 ≤ M.I fλ <
2β
1+β, the condition (15)
cannot hold for any pR
1 (≤ p∗
1). Thus, for λ <
2β
1+β, all banks go bankrupt from bank runs for any
iR
1 ≥ 0. Therefore, for 1
x(1+β) ≤ λ <
2β
1+β, banks are forced to sell all their goods in a ﬁre sale,
since the cash in the economy is M, while the depositors’ demand for cash is 2βM.S i n c e t h e
expectation is that pR
1 ≤ p∗
1, the lucky withdrawers who have a chance to buy the goods at p∗
1
wait to buy the goods at pR












x(1+β) ≤ λ <
2β
1+β the new price pR
1 satisﬁes pR
1 ≤ p∗




1+β ≤ λ < 1, there exist sets of (pR
1 ,i R
1 ) that satisfy (14). Suppose that iR
1 > 0. In this
case, an argument similar to that of the baseline case (page 17) holds, implying pR
1 cR
1 = M.S i n c e






= A,a n dt h e
resource constraint (cR
2 = A{λAK0 − cR




1 .T h e r e f o r e
i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tcR
1 <c ∗
1, implying that pR
1 >p ∗
1, which is a contradiction. Therefore,
iR
1 = 0 in the equilibrium where λ ≥
2β
1+β and banks continue to operate. Since consumers hold
both cash and bank deposits when iR
1 = 0, the condition (14) becomes (15). Lemma 1 implies
that the banks operate the capital ineﬃciently when iR
1 = 0 so that the productivity becomes a.
Therefore, for
2β









1, {2β +1− λ(1 + β)}M ≤ R1 ≤ M, iR
1 =0 ,a n dpR
2 = a−1pR
1 . Note that the
bank-run equilibrium does not exist for
2β
1+β < λ < 1, since we make Assumption 10.
7It is easily shown that the following argument still holds for the case where the ﬁre sale occurs.
22In sum, we have shown the following: if 0 < λ < 1
x(1+β), bank runs occur and all banks go
bankrupt, resulting the equilibrium price pR
1 >p ∗
1;i f 1
x(1+β) ≤ λ <
2β
1+β, bank runs occur and all




1+β ≤ λ < 1, iR
1 =0 ,t h e r ea r en o
bank runs, but moral hazard occurs. (End of Proof)
When 1
x(1+β) ≤ λ <
2β
1+β,t h en e wp r i c epR
1 b e c o m e sl e s st h a np∗
1.W ec a ni n t e r p r e t
this price change from p∗
1 to pR
1 as the debt deﬂation caused by bank runs and ﬁre sales.
In this case, after all banks go bankrupt and the economy is disintermediated, each
consumer holds λxAK0 units of the consumer good and M units of cash.
Equilibrium after Debt Deﬂation In order to specify the equilibrium after debt
deﬂation, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 12 After the disintermediation, no production technology is available, and
consumers must store the consumer goods for the date-2 consumption.





    
    
pR
1 c1 + pR
1 s + M1 ≤ pR
1 λxAK0 + M,
pR
2 c2 + T2 ≤ pR
2 s + M1,
pR
2 c2 ≤ M1 (CIA constraint),
(16)
where T2 = M.T h e s o l u t i o n ( c1,c 2) to this consumer’s program is feasible if c1 ≥ 0,
c2 ≥ 0, and c1 + c2 ≤ λxAK0. It is easily shown that (PRC) has a feasible solution only
if pR
2 = ∞, and the unique feasible solution is (c1,c 2,s,M 1)=( λxAK0,0,0,M).
4 Policy Responses to Bank Insolvency
After the shock λ hits the economy, the government has several policy options to cope
with bank runs and subsequent disintermediation. In this section we compare the welfare
eﬀects of three policies: a deposit guarantee, unlimited liquidity support, and bank
23recapitalization. Note that these policy responses are necessitated since the shock λ hits
all banks.8
A deposit guarantee is a policy under which the government guarantees that all
deposits will be repaid in full, but it does not supply cash or goods to banks unless
they run out of assets. In order to fulﬁll the commitment to guarantee deposits, the
government must impose a tax on consumers and transfer the goods to banks after the
banks’ assets are exhausted.
Unlimited liquidity support is a policy under which the government supplies as much
c a s ht ob a n k sa st h e yn e e d .T h ec a s hi sc r e a t e db yt h eg o v e r n m e n t ,a n di ti sr e d e e m e d
by imposing taxes on consumers at date 2. This policy involves a transfer of value from
consumers to banks by seigniorage.
Bank recapitalization is a policy under which the government transfers goods or cash
to banks as a subsidy in order to restore their solvency. The cost of recapitalization
is ﬁnanced by seigniorage or taxation. Under a recapitalization policy, the government
transfers a ﬁxed amount of resources ex ante, but it does not transfer any resources ex
post, unlike in the case of a deposit guarantee or unlimited liquidity support.
4.1 Deposit Guarantee
We deﬁne the deposit guarantee policy as follows. The government declares at date 1
that all deposits will be repaid in full at any time. But the government does not supply
cash or transfer the goods before the withdrawals occur at date 1. If the banks exhaust
their assets during the withdrawals at date 1 or date 2, the government uses a portion
of its tax revenue to pay back the depositors. Thus, the government redistributes the
goods from consumers to withdrawers through taxation. We can also assume that when
the government implements a deposit guarantee policy, consumers rationally expect that
the government will collect the cost of the deposit guarantee policy at date 1 or date 2
as a lump-sum tax on consumers.
8If the shock λ is idiosyncratic and observable, deposit insurance among the banks can prevent bank
runs.





2 ) under a deposit guarantee policy.
If pD
1 >p ∗
1, all depositors withdraw their entire deposits in order to make use of the
arbitrage opportunity in which they buy goods at p∗
1 and sell them at pD
1 .T h e r e f o r e
t h es a m ea r g u m e n ta si nt h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2i m p l i e st h a ti nt h ec a s ew h e r e
0 ≤ λ < 1
x(1+β), banks go bankrupt and stop to operate at date 1 in spite of the deposit
guarantee by the government. The cost of the deposit guarantee is collected through a
lump-sum tax on consumers. Thus we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If 0 ≤ λ < 1
x(1+β) and the macroeconomic expectation is that pD
1 >p ∗
1,a l l
banks go bankrupt and the economy is disintermediated at date 1 even with a deposit
guarantee by the government.
If 1
x(1+β) ≤ λ < 1, the equilibrium is diﬀerent from the disintermediation. We can
show the following:
Lemma 3 If 1
x(1+β) ≤ λ < 1, the new equilibrium price satisﬁes pD
1 ≤ p∗
1.
(Proof) Suppose that pD
1 >p ∗
1. Then all depositors withdraw their entire deposits and the banks
go bankrupt. The ﬁre sale drives the price down to M
xλAK0, which is no greater than p∗
1 because
λ ≥ 1
x(1+β). This is a contradiction. Thus pD
1 ≤ p∗
1.( E n do fP r o o f )
In the equilibrium under a deposit guarantee policy where the macroeconomic ex-
pectation is pD
1 ≤ p∗
1, banks continue to operate at dates 1 and 2. In this situation,
the deposit guarantee policy has a serious side eﬀect. Since the government protects
bank deposits, the depositors have no incentive to make a run on banks even when the
latter are using capital ineﬃciently. Therefore, moral hazard for banks inevitably results



















1 + D1 ≤ (1 + 2β)M,
pD
2 cD
2 + T2 ≤ (1 + iD
1 )D1,
(17)
where T2(≥ M) is the expected amount of tax, including the additional cost of the













We can show the following proposition. As we show in the proof of the proposition,
t h e r ei sar a n g eo fv a l u e so fT2 that supports the equilibrium. If the government credibly
announces an inappropriate value of T2 at date 1, there is no equilibrium. We assume that
the government declares the deposit guarantee without announcing T2,a n dt h ec o n s u m e r s
and banks form a rational expectation of T2, given the government’s declaration.
Proposition 3 Assume that the government adopts a deposit guarantee policy after a
shock λ hits the economy. If 1
x(1+β) ≤ λ < x
β, the nominal interest rate becomes zero
(i.e., iD





= a−1 in the equilibrium. If x
β < λ < 1,t h e r e






= a−1.I nt h eo t h e r ,











(Proof) We consider the condition for iD
1 > 0 in the equilibrium. In this case the consumers solve
(PCD), and the banks solve (PBD). The FOCs for (PCD) and (PBD) and the resource constraint






Lemma 3 guarantees that pD
1 satisﬁes pD
1 = zp∗




1 = zλM<M .
Therefore, in the equilibrium, consumers withdraw zλM from banks and buy λc∗
1. Since banks
already hold M units of cash reserve and they can do nothing to equate the date-1 withdrawal
with M,t h ec a s h( 1− zλ)M remains in banks after consumers’ withdrawals at date 1. Since
iD
1 > 0, consumers choose to hold no cash at the end of date 1, and the banks must hold all
the cash (M) as the reserve for date-2 withdrawals. And when banks hold M as the reserve,
i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tM is no greater than the expected amount of withdrawals (pD
2 cD
2 )a t








1 > 0. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of holding one unit of cash reserve
less than pD
2 cD






x − (1 + iD
1 ). If 1
x − (1 + iD
1 ) < 0, then banks choose to have
no cash reserve. Therefore, in the equilibrium where banks have a cash reserve M,i tm u s tb e
t h ec a s et h a t 1
x − (1 + iD
1 ) ≥ 0. In this case, M = pD
2 cD






Then the condition 1
x − (1 + iD
1 ) ≥ 0 is rewritten as λ ≥ x
zβ. Therefore, we have shown that
if x
β ≤ λ < 1, there exists an interval of z:[ x
βλ,1] such that for z ∈ [ x













1 .I n t h i s










1,a n dT2 =
1+2β−zλ−zβλ
zβλ M. (Note that
if the government sets the tax at T2 6=
1+2β−zλ−zβλ
zβλ M, then there is no equilibrium in which
iD
1 > 0.) At date 2 the government fulﬁlls its deposit-guarantee commitment by transferring a
portion of the goods collected as the tax (T2) from consumers to the withdrawers, since the banks
run out of assets at date 2.
Next we show that there exists another equilibrium in which iD
1 =0f o ra l lλ that satisﬁes
1
x(1+β) < λ < 1. Suppose that iD
1 =0a n dpD
1 = zp∗
1 (0 ≤ z ≤ 1) in the equilibrium. The FOC for
(PBD) implies that pD
2 = 1
apD




1 ). In this
case, the cash demand by consumers at date 2 is pD
2 cD
2 = zβλM.L e tW be the withdrawals at
date 2, and R1 the cash reserves of the banks. For a bank, the opportunity cost of holding cash in
excess of W is zero, and the opportunity cost of holding cash less than W is 1
x−1 > 0. Thus banks
set their cash reserves at R1 ≥ W at the end of date 1. Since consumers are indiﬀerent between
bank deposits and cash when the nominal interest rate is zero, they hold M −R1 units of cash in
hand at the end of date 1. The budget constraint implies that M − R1 + D1 =( 1+2 β − zλ)M
and T2 =( 1+2 β − zλ − zλβ)M.T h e v a l u e s o f W and R1 are indeterminate but satisfy the
cash-in-advance constraint: W +M −R1 ≥ zβλM. This equilibrium exists for all z ∈ [0,1]. (End
of Proof)
This proposition states that if the macro shock is large (i.e., λ ≤ x
β), a deposit
guarantee policy leads the economy into an equilibrium where the nominal interest rate
is zero and moral hazard occurs. In this equilibrium, the inﬂation rate is 1






βA in the baseline case. If the parameter a is close to A such that a>βA,
then we have mild deﬂation under a zero nominal interest rate in the equilibrium, just
as we have had in the Japanese economy since the late 1990s. Low interest rates during
27deﬂation were also observed in the U.S. economy during the Great Depression.
The deposit guarantee prevents the ineﬃciency associated with a ﬁre sale (or liqui-
dation) of bank assets, but at the same time this policy inevitably induces moral hazard
for banks.
4.2 Unlimited Liquidity Support
We can show that the unlimited liquidity support policy brings about welfare eﬀects
similar to those of a deposit guarantee policy. We deﬁne the unlimited liquidity support
policy as follows. At date 1, the government declares that it will supply an unlimited
amount of liquidity on demand to banks. The government supplies cash ∆M on demand
to banks for payment to withdrawers. At the end of date 1 the banks choose eﬃcient
or ineﬃcient use of capital, and the consumers redeposit their cash after observing the
banks’ choice. The total cash that exists in the economy between dates 1 and 2 becomes
M + ∆M. At date 2, the government collects all cash as the tax: T2 = M + ∆M.N o t e
that this policy is not the same as the ordinary provision of liquidity by the central bank
in normal circumstances. Unlimited liquidity support involves the transfer of value from
consumers to banks by seigniorage.9 We can prove the following proposition:





there is no equilibrium with a positive interest rate under the unlimited liquidity support
policy.
(Proof) We assume that iL
1 > 0. In this case we can show that pL
1 >p ∗
1 by contradiction. Under
the liquidity support policy, the banks continue to operate at dates 1 and 2. Suppose that pL
1 ≤ p∗
1
in the equilibrium where the interest rate is positive. Arguments similar to those of the baseline
case hold, and we have pL
1 cL








= ˜ A where ˜ A = A or a is the equilibrium productivity, and the resource constraint says
9The ordinary liquidity lending at the market rate of interest does not help the banks hit by the shock
λ since the diﬃculty they face is not only the liquidity shortage but also insolvency.
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2 = ˜ A{λAK0 − cL




2 = ˜ AβcL
1, which implies pL
1 = λ−1p∗
1 >p ∗
1. This is a contradiction. Therefore, the





1, Assumption 9 implies that all depositors withdraw (1 + 2β)M at date 1.
Therefore the cash injection at date 1 is ∆M =2 βM. The lucky depositors (measure π) buy
(2β +1 ) c∗
1 units of the goods at p∗
1, while the other can buy the goods only at pL
1 .T h e l u c k y
consumers solve


















The unlucky consumers solve











1 ≤ (2β +1 ) M,
pL
2 c00






1 +( 1− π)c00
1, cL
2 ≡ πc0
2 +( 1− π)c00
2,a n dDL
1 ≡ πD0





1 + D1 ≤ (2β +1 ) ( πpL
1 c∗
1 +( 1− π)M),
pL
2 cL










˜ A{λAK0 − cL











1 )= ˜ A.
The FOCs and the budget constraint (21) imply pL(cL
1 −πc∗




FOCs and the budget constraint (21) imply that D1 =
(1−π)λ






The conditions for the banks to set the cash reserve at pL
2cL
2 are 1 + iL
1 − 1=iL
1 > 0a n d
1
x − (1 + iL





which is violated if (18) holds. (The condition (18) holds for x>. 33 if β = .9.) Therefore, an
equilibrium with a positive interest rate does not exist in this case. (End of Proof)
29This proposition states that under the unlimited liquidity support policy, the gov-
ernment provides too much cash so that no banks would hold cash in the case where
i1 > 0.
Proposition 5 Suppose that π ≈ 0. If the government sets iL
1 =0under the unlimited
liquidity support policy, it can attain the equilibrium where there are no bank runs, but
moral hazard occurs for banks.
(Proof) First we show that if iL
1 =0 ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tpL
1 ≤ p∗




0 = 0. The similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4 imply that ∆M must be 2βM,
and the aggregate budget constraint is (21). Setting iL




1{(1 + β)λ − (2β +1 ) π} = −(2β +1 ) πM,
which implies pL




Next we show that there exists an equilibrium where pL
1 = zp∗
1 (0 <z<1) under a liquidity
support policy that satisﬁes iL
1 = 0. Since the government sets iL
1 = 0, the price must satisfy
pL
1 = zp∗
1 for some z (0 <z≤ 1). Since the government declares that it supplies an unlimited
amount of liquidity to banks, consumers and banks have the expectations that banks continue to






and the resource constraint is cL
2 = a(λAK0 −cL







1 = zλM and pL
2 cL
2 = βzλM. The budget constraint for consumers and T2 = M +∆M imply
∆M = {2β − (1 + β)zλ}M. (22)
In the equilibrium where i1 = 0, the values of withdrawal W a n dc a s hr e s e r v e sR1 are indeter-
minate, but satisﬁes R1 >Wand W + M − R1 ≥ zβλM.W eh a v es h o w nt h a tf o re a c hz there
exists an equilibrium in which iL
1 =0 ,a n dm o r a lh a z a r do c c u r s .( E n do fP r o o f )
The above propositions state that in the equilibrium under the unlimited liquidity
provision policy, moral hazard is induced for banks, and the aggregate productivity
declines from A to a.T h u st h ew e l f a r ee ﬀect of the liquidity provision policy is same as
that of a deposit guarantee policy: the policy can prevent the ineﬃciency of a ﬁre sale
(or liquidation) of bank assets, but it inevitably induces moral hazard for banks.
304.3 Bank Recapitalization
Our interest is in determining whether there exists an optimal policy that can prevent
both ﬁre sales and moral hazard. Since moral hazard is caused by the commitment
to provide an unlimited supply of goods or liquidity when banks run short, we should
consider the type of policies in which the government supplies a ﬁxed amount of resources
to the banks before withdrawals occur and declares that it will not supply additional
resources ex post.
In this section we examine bank recapitalization through the infusion of public funds
from this point of view. In our model, we can consider two types of bank recapitalization
policy. One is an approach that transfers value from consumers to banks by monetary
policy or seigniorage. In this case the government creates cash ∆M and gives it to the
banks at date 1, and collects all the cash in the economy (M + ∆M) by taxation on
consumers (T2 = M + ∆M) at date 2. The other type of recapitalization policy is an
approach that transfers value by ﬁscal policy. There are various diﬀerent ﬁscal measures
that can be used to transfer value, but it can be easily understood that they result in
t h es a m ew e l f a r ee ﬀe c t sw i t h i no u rs i m p l em o d e l . W ee x a m i n et h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h e
government issues bonds (B), gives B to the banks at date 1, and redeems the bonds by
taxation on consumers (T2 = M +( 1+i1)B).
We denote the variables in the equilibrium under the bank recapitalization policy
with superscript C:p r i c e s( pC
1 ,p C
2 ,i C
1 ) and the allocation (cC
1 ,c C
2 ).
4.3.1 Case 1: Recapitalization by Monetary Policy
We examine the ﬁrst type of recapitalization policy. At date 1, the government creates
cash ∆M and gives it to the banks before withdrawals occur. The government declares
that it will not provide any additional resources to the banks during or after the with-
drawals of date 1. The government levies the tax T2 = M +∆M on consumers at date 2.
We call this policy “monetary recapitalization” in the following. We prove the following
proposition.
31Proposition 6 Suppose that π ≈ 0 and x>2
3. If the government implements monetary
recapitalization that satisﬁes ∆M ≥ max{(2β −(1+β)λ)M, (β − 1
2)M},t h ee q u i l i b r i u m
interest rate becomes zero, and moral hazard inevitably occurs for banks.
(Proof) There are four cases10 for the equilibrium interest rate and price: (Case 1) iC
1 =0a n d
pC
1 ≤ p∗
1,( C a s e2 )iC
1 =0a n dpC
1 >p ∗
1,( C a s e3 )iC
1 > 0a n dpC
1 ≤ p∗
1,a n d( C a s e4 )iC




Case 1. If iC
1 =0a n dpC
1 ≤ p∗
1, the equilibrium outcome is same as that described in
Proposition 5. Lemma 1 implies that moral hazard occurs in this case.
Case 2. Lemma 1 also implies that moral hazard occurs in an equilibrium where iC
1 =0a n d
pC
1 >p ∗
1, if it exists.
Case 3. We show that if iC
1 > 0t h e npC
1 cannot be less than or equal to p∗
1. Suppose that
iC
1 > 0. Consumers deposit their all assets in banks, and they do not hold cash. The banks hold
M+∆M units of cash as the reserves. Suppose that pC
1 ≤ p∗
1 in this case. If pC
1 ≤ p∗
1,n od e p o s i t o r s
withdraw their entire deposits at date 1. Therefore the budget constraint for consumers becomes
pC
1 cC
1 + D1 ≤ (1 + 2β)M,a n dpC
2 cC
2 + T2 =( 1+iC
1 )D1.S i n c eiC
1 > 0 the opportunity cost for
banks to hold cash in excess of date-2 withdrawals is positive. The opportunity cost for banks to
hold cash less than date-2 withdrawals is 1
x −(1+iC
1 ). Suppose that 1
x −(1+iC
1 ) < 0. In this case
no banks hold cash and so there is no equilibrium where iC
1 > 0. Thus in the equilibrium where
iC
1 > 0, it must be the case that 1
x −(1+iC
1 ) ≥ 0, which implies M +∆M = pC
2 cC
2 .S i n c eab a n k ’ s
liability must be equal to its assets at date 2, (1+iC
1 )D1 = pC
2 cC






1 . All these equations imply pC
1 cC
1 = M.S i n c e cC
1 = λc∗
1 in






1.T h i si s
a contradiction. Thus, in the equilibrium where iC
1 > 0, it must be the case that pC
1 >p ∗
1.
Case 4. We show that there is no equilibrium in which iC




1 > 0a n dpC
1 >p ∗
1 in the equilibrium. In this case, all depositors try to withdraw their entire
deposits (1+2β)M.I f∆M ≥ 2βM, the outcome is the same as that described in Proposition 4.
T h u si nt h ec a s ew h e r e∆M ≥ 2βM, there is no equilibrium. (Note that Proposition 5 implies
that the equilibrium with iC
1 = 0 exists only if ∆M<2β.) If (β − 1
2)M ≤ ∆M<2βM,t h e
banks can pay (2β +1 ) M to the depositors at date 1 by selling a portion of their assets in a
ﬁre sale. In this case, the aggregate budget constraint for the consumers is similar to (21) since
10Note that there is no disintermediation, since M + ∆M ≥ (β +
1
2)M, which implies that banks can





1 + D1 ≤ (2β +1 ) ( πpC
1 c∗
1 +( 1− π)M),
pC
2 cC
2 + T2 ≤ (1 + iC
1 )D1.
(23)
In this equilibrium it must be the case that
1
x
− (1 + i
C
1 ) ≥ 0, (24)
since otherwise no banks hold cash. We will clarify the condition for (24) later. Assuming that
(24) is satisﬁed, we have pC
2 cC


















Since ∆M is predetermined, the withdrawal of (1 + 2β)M causes a partial ﬁre sale of the bank






























(1 + β)M(λ − π)
. (27)
Now we examine the condition for (24). Since equation (27) and pC
2 cC
2 = β(1 + iC
1 )pC
1 cC

















Since the condition (28) does not hold for ∆M that satisﬁes (β − 1
2)M ≤ ∆M<2βM if π ≈ 0
and x>2
3, there exists no equilibrium in which iC
1 > 0a n dpC
1 >p ∗
1.
The above analysis on Cases 1—4 implies that the equilibrium interest rate under monetary
recapitalization must be zero, and thus moral hazard occurs in the equilibrium. (End of Proof)
The analysis on Case 4 implies that monetary recapitalization provides too much
cash so that 1
x − (1 + i1) < 0 holds and banks are unwilling to hold cash reserves. To
have 1
x − (1 + i1) > 0, the government must supply insolvent banks non-cash assets.
4.3.2 Case 2: Recapitalization by Fiscal Policy
The second type of recapitalization is the following: At date 1, after the shock λ hits
the economy, the government issues bonds amounting to B, and gives this amount to
33the banks before withdrawals occur. The government declares that it will not provide
any additional resources to the banks during or after the withdrawals of date 1. The
government levies the tax T2 = M+(1+iC
1 )B on consumers at date 2. We call this policy
“ﬁscal recapitalization.”11 We assume that the government bond B has the same return
proﬁle as a bank deposit, and that the sale of the bonds does not result in a deadweight
loss, unlike a ﬁre sale of consumer goods.
Assumption 13 The government bond B issued at date 1 yields (1+iC
1 )B units of cash
at date 2. The bond B is exchangeable for B units of cash at date 1. When the banks sell
the bond at date 1 and pay the proceeds of the bond sale to the depositors on the same
date, they do not incur the deadweight loss as associated with a ﬁre sale of consumer
goods.
This assumption states that government bonds and bank deposits are equivalent assets
for consumers. The latter part of the assumption is just for simplicity of exposition:
we can derive qualitatively identical results even if a ﬁre sale of the bonds generates a
deadweight loss.
Proposition 7 There exists a ﬁscal recapitalization policy that supports the optimal equi-
librium in which pC
1 ≤ p∗
1, iC
1 > 0 and both ﬁre sales of the goods and moral hazard for
the banks are prevented.
(Proof) It is suﬃcient to examine the case where iC
1 > 0 (Lemma 1). We derive the conditions
for B that induce the optimal equilibrium, where ﬁre sales and moral hazard are prevented.
We derive the condition for pC
1 ≤ p∗
1 in the equilibrium where iC
1 > 0. Suppose that pC
1
exceeds p∗
1. Then all depositors try to withdraw (2β +1 ) M. Since the banks’ cash reserve is M,
and the banks can obtain cash M by selling all their assets, the total cash that the banks can
pay to the depositors is 2M, which is less than (2β +1 ) M.T h e r e f o r ei fpC
1 >p ∗
1, the banks go
11There are several other ﬁscal measures to recapitalize the banks. For example, the government can
tax consumers at date 1 and transfer the tax revenue (i.e., cash or goods) to the banks on the same date,
or it can issue bonds, sell them to consumers, and give the proceeds of the bond sale (i.e., cash) to the
banks on date 1. It is easily conﬁrmed that these policies have the same welfare eﬀect as the above ﬁscal
recapitalization policy.
34bankrupt, and pC








Since no production technology is available in this case (see Assumption 12), the equilibrium





   
   
pC
1 c1 + pC
1 s + M1 + B1 ≤ pC
1 λxAK0 + B + M,
pC
2 c2 + T2 ≤ pC
2 s + M1 +( 1+iC
1 )B1,
pC
2 c2 ≤ M1,
(30)
where T2 = M +( 1+iC
1 )B. In the disintermediated economy, the nominal interest rate iC
1 is set






since the only asset is the consumer good that is stored; one unit of cash
is transformed into 1
pC
1






at date 2. As in the case of equilibrium after debt deﬂation (page 23), it is easily shown that
pC
2 = ∞ and (c1,s,c 2,M 1,B 1)=( λxAK0,0,0,M,B) in the equilibrium after disintermediation;
each consumer stores cash (M) and bonds (B), and pays them to the government as the tax
T2 = M +( 1+iC
1 )B = ∞.
If the government sets B such that
B ≥ {1 − λx(1 + β)}M, (31)
then the equation (29) implies that pC
1 = M−B
λxAK0 ≤ p∗
1. Therefore, if the government sets B to
satisfy (31), the price in disintermediation (pC
1 ) must be no greater than p∗
1. So we assume that
the government sets B in such a way. Since pC
1 ≤ p∗
1 in this case, there are no depositors who
make runs on banks in the equilibrium. Thus the aggregate budget constraint is
pC
1 cC
1 + D1 ≤ (1 + 2β)M,
pC
2 cC












x − (1 + iC
1 ). We will verify later that
1
x
− (1 + iC
1 ) > 0. (33)
35Assuming that (33) holds, we have pC
2 cC






1 .S i n c eT2 = M +( 1+iC
1 )B,w eh a v e
pC
1 cC




Since there is no ﬁre sale when pC
1 ≤ p∗




1.I ft h eg o v e r n m e n ts e t s
B ≡ (2β +1 ) ( 1− z)M ≥ (2β + 1)(1 − λ)M, (35)








1. We have shown that by setting z ≤ λ,t h e
government can induce a situation where pC
1 ≤ p∗
1 and prevent ﬁre sales.
We will now examine the condition for z (or B) to prevent moral hazard. Suppose that a bank
oﬀers its depositors to renegotiate at date 1 after it forms its capital of λAK0 − cC
1 . The bank’s
liability is D1 =( 1 + 2 β)M−pC
1 cC
1 =( 1 + 2 β)M−zM, while its assets are M units of cash, B units
of the bond, and λAK0−cC
1 = βcC
1 units of capital. The amount of cash that the bank can collect
by selling the bonds and the goods in a ﬁre sale is M+B+xpC
1 βcC
1 = M+(1+2β)(1−z)M+βxzM.
This amount is less than the bank’s liability if
1 ≤ zβ(2 − x). (36)
If (36) holds, the bank’s oﬀer of renegotiation results in the bankruptcy of the bank at date 1.










βz ≤ 2 − x.N o w w e v e r i f y ( 3 3 ) :1
x − (1 + iC
1 ) ≥ 1
x + x − 2 > 0f o r
0 <x<1. Thus if B satisﬁes (31), (35), and (36), then the equilibrium in which iC
1 > 0i s












Obviously this condition (37) is satisﬁed, since the discount factor β is larger than 1
6.T h e r e f o r e
the government can pick z that satisﬁes 0 ≤ z<Z ,a n ds e tB =( 1+2 β)(1 − z)M.I n t h i s
equilibrium, both the ﬁre sale and moral hazard are prevented, and the optimal consumption
allocation is realized. (End of Proof)
This result appears to be quite diﬀerent from that of Diamond and Rajan (2002b),
who claim that recapitalization of failing banks during a ﬁnancial crisis may worsen the
crisis. Diamond and Rajan (2002b) seem to use the term “recapitalization” to represent
36a policy that transfers liquidity to an insolvent bank from other banks. Thus in their
model, the amount of aggregate liquidity does not increase at date 1, and therefore bank
bailouts result in more ineﬃcient liquidation of bank assets. This outcome seems similar
to that of a deposit guarantee in our model (Lemma 2).
In the ﬁscal recapitalization policy of our model, however, the government can create
aggregate liquidity when it recapitalizes insolvent banks by issuing government bonds,
which can be sold in the market at date 1: The government bond in our model is
accepted as a liquid asset by consumers. Thus in our model, ﬁscal recapitalization solves
the problems of both insolvency and illiquidity. Diamond and Rajan (2002a) also state
that capital injections can provide better outcomes when combined with injections of
liquidity.
Propositions 5 and 6 imply, however, that cash injections alone are not suﬃcient
to attain the optimal allocation. This is because the increase in the money supply
distorts the decision making of banks through the cash-in-advance constraint, while ﬁscal
recapitalization can avoid this distortion.12
5 Conclusion
When the economy is hit by a macroeconomic shock that makes the banking system
insolvent and thus raises the risk of debt deﬂation, diﬀerent policy responses have quite
diﬀerent welfare eﬀects.
A deposit guarantee, unlimited liquidity support, and monetary recapitalization gen-
erate ineﬃcient outcomes. Fiscal recapitalization is the optimal policy that can prevent
both moral hazard (ineﬃcient use of capital) at banks and the premature liquidation of
bank assets. In crisis-hit countries, policies of temporization, such as a deposit guaran-
tee and unlimited liquidity support, are often adopted. Our results imply that a deposit
12Boyd, Chang, and Smith (2000) argue that to monetize the cost of bank bailouts is better than
taxation. In their model, cash is introduced by the reserve requirement imposed by the government, and
it does not induce moral hazard for banks as it does under a zero nominal interest rate in our model (See
Lemma 1). Therefore, monetization is not ineﬃcient in their model, while it is in ours.
37guarantee and unlimited liquidity support may give rise to a combination of mild de-
ﬂation and low interest rates (Propositions 3, 5, and 6). Our results also imply that
temporizing without recapitalizing insolvent banks causes a larger welfare loss. These
implications are consistent with the observations on recent ﬁnancial crises that we refer
to in Section 1.
Let us examine the Japanese economy of the 1990s in our theoretical framework.13
Although Japan experienced a full-ﬂedged crash of its asset-price bubble at the beginning
of the 1990s, the government did not begin to recapitalize major banks until 1998; during
the 1990s the government insisted that it would never allow the occurrence of a bank
closure; meanwhile, the central bank has kept the short-term interest rate at zero since
1995. This attitude of the Japanese government can be interpreted as employing the
policy of a deposit guarantee14 and liquidity support.15 The decade-long stagnation of
the Japanese economy seems consistent with the predictions of our model. The deﬂation
since the late 1990s can also be interpreted as a result of the implementation of a deposit
guarantee without suﬃcient recapitalization.
In short, Japan’s prolonged recession and current deﬂation may have been caused by
an inappropriate policy response to bank insolvency: temporization with “too little and
too late” recapitalization.
13We can easily generalize this two-period model into a multi-period model preserving the intuition
so that the basic implication of the model can be applied to the decade-long recession of the Japanese
economy.
14Although Japan established a deposit insurance system in the 1970s that guarantees up to 10 million
yen for any single depositor, there was a tacit understanding that the government would never let any
bank close, meaning in practice that deposits were guaranteed without limit. In 1995, the government
declared explicitly that it would guarantees all deposits without limit for the time being. This unlimited
deposit guarantee has still not been eliminated as of 2003.
15The monetary easing by the Bank of Japan was very aggressive, but it turned out that the speed
and the scale of the monetary policy were insuﬃcient. The BOJ’s intension was to provide temporary
liquidity support but not to subsidize the insolvent banks by seigniorage. Therefore, the monetary policy
in the 1990s was insuﬃcient for the restoration of bank solvency.
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